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STRATEGIC AND GENERAL





Incentive compatibility in poverty alleviation game for the most efficient and just 
allocation of resources and maximisation of social welfare requires cooperation from 
both rich and poor households, governments and the global community. Non-
cooperation among them only deepens poverty with socially, economically and 
morally unacceptable magnitudes of malnutrition, hunger-disease-illness, tensions 
and conflicts, illiteracy and lack of education and skills. Scientific analyses and 
systematic implementation of poverty reduction initiatives require strategic and multi-
household general equilibrium models to compliment standard Booth-Rowntree, Sen-
Atkinson and FGT or Jenkins-Lambert type absolute, relative, chronic or intensity 
measures of poverty in order to evaluate dynamic impacts actions taken for alleviation 
of poverty. Bad game results in poverty and good game results in prosperity. No 
analyses of poverty can be considered complete without evaluating income and 
substitution effects on welfare of these households based on the price mechanism 
and allocation of resources in the wider economy.  
Keywords: poverty, redistribution, dynamic model 
JEL Classification: D63, O15 
1.  Introduction
1
Poverty is measured relatively and absolutely. Adam Smith (1776) was absolutist, for 
him it meant being ashamed to appear in public due to inability to afford necessary 
things according to the custom and standards of the country: “... A linen shirt is strictly 
speaking not a necessity of life. The Greeks and Romans lived very comfortably 
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though they had no linen. But in the present time ... a creditable day-laborer would be 
ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt...” Marx followed Adam Smith in 
thinking that necessary wants of the workers were products of historical development 
that depended to a great extent on the degree of civilization of the country [Marx and 
Engles (1848)]. Rowntree (1902) in a study of minimum living standards for a 
respectable life in York in Britain considered a family to be living in poverty if its total 
earnings were insufficient to obtain the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of 
merely physical needs; the minimum requirements of protein and calories, housing, 
thermal comforts, basic health and education. Based on expenditure on porridge and 
skim milk for breakfast, bread and cheese for lunch, vegetable broth, bread, cheese, 
dumpling for dinner, and bread and porridge for supper he set a poverty threshold and 
determined the number of poor households below that line [Glennester, Huills,   
Piachaud and Webb (2004)]. Beveridge (1942) took these facts into account while 
designing social insurance programs. Orshansky (1965) did similar study for the 
United States. Townsend (1969) revisited them for the UK. Sen (1976), Foster and 
Shorrocks (1985), Basu (1985), Vaughan (1987), Preston (1995), Shorrocks (1995) 
and Chakravarty (1997), Davidson and Duclos (2000) then focused on theoretical 
issues relating to definition and relative and absolute measurement of poverty. Sen’s 
(1976) note on inadequacy of the head count ratio and a need for poverty gap to 
measure the depth of poverty that would fulfill axioms of monotonicity, transfer, 
relative equity and ordinal rank to capture severity of deprivation of households under 
the poverty line has been extended to cases of temporary and chronic poverty 
adjusting the poverty gap for its duration by Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984). 
Importance of Pigou-Dalton transfer axiom and first and second order stochastic 
dominance properties indicated by Atkinson (1970 and 1987) were implemented by 
Beckerman (1979) and using subjective method by Praag, Goedhard and Papeyn 
(1980) and Jenkins (1991) and Jenkins and Lambert (1997) showing how transfers 
could eliminate poverty among low income households. Blundell et al. (2000) applied 
that to evaluate the impacts of income tax credit in consumption and income inequality 
in UK
2.
  There is no magic wand to eliminate massive poverty that exists around the 
world. It depends on strategic interactions among players of the poverty game. 
Effective implementation of poverty alleviation programmes requires thinking of 
strategies and actions available to major players in the poverty game - poor 
themselves who are often considered beneficiaries of aids, grants and transfers; rich 
individuals who bear the burden of taxes to pay for those transfers; the governments 
that are involved not only in measuring the depth of poverty and setting up objectives, 
targets and programmes that aim to eliminate poverty but also are subject to 
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poverty have made alleviation of poverty one of the major global agenda in recent years (of 
Live 8 concerts in 2005, G8 Meetings, poverty alleviations programmes of many developing 
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distortions arising from corruption and misuse of public money; and the global 
community that can provide a natural and fair playing fields for these players. 
Designing an effective incentive structure in dynamic contexts and balancing 
economic and political power over the benchmark equilibrium path of these 
economies is essential.
  Ideally high income individuals would like to see the end of poverty as has 
been campaigned by public and private sectors in advanced countries in recent years 
but it is logical for them to expect that poor who receive benefits make good efforts to 
get out of the poverty trap by investing their time and resources in education, skill and 
training and health care and economically productive initiatives with a clear foresight 
of progress over a horizon rather than doles for daily consumptions. Government, 
made of representatives of both poor and rich people, may propose very ideal 
programmes, rules and regulations but they become ineffective in reducing poverty 
without active cooperation from tax payers and the transfer recipients. It may create 
nany-state syndrome and drag on overall growth as in many EU economies in 1990s.
    Inclusion of strategic and behavioural aspects of poverty game discussed 
above is apparently missing from the existing literature and forms the major content of 
the current paper. A numerical example is provided in the next section to summarise 
basic concepts existing in the literature to set a background for a dynamic cooperative 
and non-cooperative game of poverty in Section III and a brief reference to the 
dynamic multi-household general equilibrium model in Section IV with conclusions and 
references in the last section. 
2. A Numerical Example on the Measurement and 
Transfer for Alleviation of  Poverty 
Consider an economy inhabited by N number of individuals where income of each is 
denoted by  i y   for each i = 1,2, …, N. Income vary among individuals for economic, 
social, political, cultural or many other less obvious reasons;  j i y y z  for all   i  . A 
strict ordering implies N y y y    .. 2 1 , with corresponding ordering of welfare with 
lower income individuals having lower level of welfare. Infinite numbers of income 
configurations (distributions) are possible which often are summarised by their mean 
and variances as in Jenkins (1991) or Preston (1995). Distributions, with lower 
variances are more equal than with higher ones.






y ; the 
ratio of people below this line in relation to N individuals in society is the head count 
measure of poverty. Many countries adopt one half of the average income as a cut-off 
point for absolute poverty line;  y z
2
1
  , which is then used to come up with either the 
head count ratio, which is the ratio of number of people below the poverty line divided 
by the total number of individuals in the population or the income gap ratio more Institute of Economic Forecasting
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preferably measure of the depth of poverty which indicates the deficiency of income in 










   .  Sen (1976) requires further modification to 
poverty gap to capture the income inequality to achieve monotonicity as well as the 
transfer axiom to reflect increase in poverty when resources are transferred from 
poorest poor to less poor persons as: 
 G I H I H P     1 .  (1) 
here P is a composite index of poverty, H the headcount ratio, I the income gap ratio, 
G the Gini coefficient; higher values of H, I, and G mean higher degree of poverty.
Numerical example in Table 1 and associated Figure 1 can illustrate these concepts 
more accurately and effectively. 
Table 1 
Measuring poverty in a hypothetical economy 
y N  Cy  cp Yshre  cyshre Pshre  cpshre  Triangle Rectangle  Area  ygap 
10 1  10  1  0.01  0.01 0.1 0.1 0.0005 0.000  0.0005  -90 
20 1  30  2  0.02  0.03 0.1 0.2 0.001 0.001  0.0020  -80 
30 1  60  3  0.03  0.06 0.1 0.3 0.0015 0.003  0.0045  -70 
40 1  100  4  0.04  0.10 0.1 0.4 0.0020 0.006  0.0080  -60 
50 1  150  5  0.05  0.15 0.1 0.5 0.0025 0.010  0.0125  -50 
60 1  210  6  0.06  0.21 0.1 0.6 0.0030 0.015  0.0180  -40 
90 1  300  7  0.09  0.30 0.1 0.7 0.0045 0.021  0.0255  -10 
100 1  400  8  0.10  0.40 0.1 0.8 0.0050 0.030  0.0350  0 
200 1  600  9  0.20  0.60 0.1 0.9 0.0100 0.040  0.0500  100 
400 1 1000 10  0.40  1.00 0.1 1.0 0.0200 0.060  0.0800  300 
Column y gives the income by households, N the number of households in each 
income category, cy and cp are cumulative income and population; yshre and cyshre
columns present income share of each decile and cumulative shares; pshre and 
cpshre columns present income share of each decile and cumulative shares; area 
under the Lorenz curve can be approximated using triangles and rectangles. 
The total income is 1000; with 10 households, average income is 100. Area under the 
Lorenz curve is 0.236, that between the Lorenz curve and equality line is 0.264; this 
implies a Gini coefficient of 0.528; higher G reflecting more unequal distribution.
By the headcount ratio seventy percent of population is poor if the accepted poverty 
line is set at the average income 100   y  but only 40 percent is poor when absolute 
poverty line is established as the half of this average income  50
2
1
    y z  as only 
four individuals are below the poverty line. As stated above, this head count ratio does 
not indicate the depth of poverty as it ignores the income gap ratio,  Strategic and General Equilibrium Models
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. Sen’s poverty index in this 
economy is 0.464 as 
   464 . 0 264 . 0 20 . 0 528 . 0 5 . 0 1 5 . 0 4 . 0 1 .        u       G I I H P
and is illustrated in Figure 1 (actual income distribution from BHPS is in Figure 2): 
Figure 1 
Poverty with Income  Inequallity 
Figure 2 
Income Distribution from the British Household Panel Survey Institute of Economic Forecasting
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The elimination of the absolute poverty in this example requires transfers of 100 to 
poor individuals with  40 1   T  for the poorest household and 30 2   T , 20 3   T  and 
10 4   T  accordingly to other three households below the poverty line. This transfer 
can be funded by a 10 percent and 20 percent tax on the income of 9
th and 10
th
deciles raising 20 and 80, respectively. This brings H to zero and I to 1 making P to 
zero. 
  It is obvious that the value of poverty index in above example as in real life is 
influenced by the choice of the poverty line; when income is perfectly equally 
distributed no one is below the poverty line;  H is zero and G also is zero with no 
poverty, P = 0; but these are extreme cases only of theoretical possibility. In a real 
world situation, values of P range between zero and one,  1 0   P , with higher P
indicating to the higher level of poverty. Empirically this poverty index varies across 
countries and over time according to characteristics of income distribution functions; it 
would have a larger value if the income distribution was more unequal or when the 
poverty line is set at the higher level. Thus the relative measure of poverty is sensitive 
to the choice of the poverty line; it is high in an economy when the mean of the 
income is taken as a poverty line than when only the half of the mean income is taken 
for it and when it is more unequal than its comparator. More fundamentally the degree 
and depth of poverty can be changed by influencing the choices of individuals and 
households and by adopting economic programmes that are more efficient and 
generate better outcomes. This means when looked from this relative sense there are 
poor in every economy, it can never be abolished. Variations in relative poverty arise 
from the basic structure of the socio-economic model adopted by the country. For this 
reason Sen focused on minimum capability view in his subsequent works. Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke (1984) have normalised poverty gap ratio to capture the severity of 
poverty  
2
1 1 ¦   
m
i
i z y n FGT  for  z yi   and see the importance of duration of 
the poverty spell in the poverty index by average poverty index given by the mean gap 










,  and  chronic 
measures of poverty as    
2
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, 1 1 ¦   
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I t FGT z Y n T C   taking gap from the 
permanent income 
*
,I t Y . Three ‘I’s Incidence, intensity and inequality (TIP) measure in 
Jenkins and Lambert (1997) obtained by cumulative ranking of people from poorest to 
richest is another smarter way of visualising poverty graphically across time, countries 
or regions or households. 
  It is often argued that poverty can be eliminated by means of tax and transfer 
as illustrated in the numerical example in Table 1 above and in Beckerman (1979). 
Broader questions arise regarding the impact of such transfer programme. First 
relates to its impact on labour supply of rich and poor individuals. Higher taxes may 
discourage rich individuals to work and transfer receipts may reduce the need to work  Strategic and General Equilibrium Models
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to earn for living for the poor. Secondly, higher taxes may discourage incentives of 
saving and investment. Third, modality of transfer payment may be crucial for long 
term growth. Providing in kind transfer in the form of education and health spending 
may be better than cash transfers to empower productive capacity of the poor. Fourth, 
in addition to transfer payments governments need to provide public goods for the 
entire population. As everyone consumes these public goods these should be 
provided by taxing on income of both rich and the poor.  Alleviation of poverty can 
better be studied in terms of a strategic model as illustrated in the next section. 
3. Game of Poverty 
Allocations should be incentive compatible for rich and poor households and the 
governments to interact cooperatively in the poverty alleviation game. The solutions of 
the game when cooperative strategies are incentive compatible for them are 
consistent to poverty alleviation objectives while the catastrophic results may occur 
when non-cooperative strategies become optimal for individual players. In a utility or 
welfare maximising world, model results will be based on comparison of expected 
welfare continent on their strategies [Vaughan (1987), Pryatt (1987), Desai and Shah 
(1988), Myles (2001)]. 
Model of the Poverty Game 
There are three players in the poverty game - poor, rich and government; each has 
three strategies available to it to play, s, l, and k , cooperation, indifference and non 
cooperation. The outcome of the game is the strategy contingent income for poor and 
rich, ) , , ( k l s y
p
t with the probability of being in particular state like this is given by 
) , , ( k l s
p
t S  and  ) , , ( k l s
R
t S , respectively and tax and transfer profiles associated to 
them. The state-space of the game rises exponentially with the length of time period t.
The objective of these rich and poor households is to maximize the expected utility 
that is assumed to be concave in income. The government can influence this outcome 
by choices of taxes and transfers that can be liberal, normal or conservative. More 
specifically, following propositions should hold in this poverty alleviation game. 
Proposition 1:  The state contingent expected money metric utility of poor is less than that of 
rich, which can be expressed as: 
    ¦¦¦¦ ¦¦¦¦
         




























t k , l , s y u ) k , l , s ( k , l , s y u ) k , l , s (
11 1 11 1
where ) , , ( k l s
p
t S  gives the probability of choosing one of strategies by poor given 
that the rich and the government has chosen l  and  k strategies. Utility is derived from Institute of Economic Forecasting
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income as given by     k l s y u
p



















 the discount factor for rich.
Proposition 2: Transfer raises money metric expected utility of poor and reduces the 
utility of rich. 
    ¦¦¦¦ ¦¦¦¦
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Proposition 3:  Incentive compatibility requires that
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Proposition 4:  Growth requires that income of both poor and rich are rising over 
time:
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Proposition 5: Termination of poverty requires that every poor individual has at least the level 
of income equal to the poverty line determined by the society. When the poverty line is defined 
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Above five propositions comprehensively incorporate all possible scenarios in the 
poverty game mentioned above. Propositions 2-5 present optimistic scenarios for a 
chosen horizon T.  Testing above propositions in a real world situation is very 
challenging exercise. It requires modelling of the entire state space of the economy. 
Moreover, in real situation consumers and producers are heterogeneous regarding 
their preferences, endowments and technology and economy is more complicated 
than depicted in the model above. In essence, it requires a general equilibrium set up 
of an economy where poor and rich households participate freely in economic 
activities taking their share of income received from supplying labour and capital 
inputs that are affected by tax and transfer system as illustrated in the next section.  Strategic and General Equilibrium Models
Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting – 1/2010  145
4. Multi-firm multi-household dynamic general 
equilibrium model for poverty 
The importance in poverty measurement analyses of a detailed specification of 
production and  consumption sides of the economy and the structure of the markets, 
government and the foreign sectors had been well noted by Swinton (1996) who 
thought poverty of an individual in terms of poor performance in the labour market. His 
model was very parsimonious. An attempt is made in this section for full 
representation of a dynamic general equilibrium economy with households, firms, 
government and the rest of the world to measure the evolution of income of 
households over time based on decisions of households and firms at the micro level 
and choices of the government at the macro level.  In this multi-household multi-
sectoral computable dynamic general equilibrium open economy model, the 
government  uses taxes and spending strategies to alleviate poverty, households 
maximise their life time welfare under various public policy initiatives geared toward 
redistribution of income and firms adopt constant returns to scale technologies that 
give them maximum profit. It is impossible to have an explicit analytical closed form 
solution for a large scale model like this but model is solved using numerical 
techniques as in Bhattarai (2007). The number of households and structure of taxes 
differ.
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s t r R is a discount factor; rs
represents the real interest rate on assets at time s;
vc t is value added tax on 
consumption,
l t is  labour income taxes, and
h
t K  is the composite consumption, which 
is composed of sectoral consumption goods, Pt is the price of composite consumption 




i t p P
D









, 1   3   .
Industries of the economy are represented by firms that combine both capital and 
labour input in production and supply goods and services to the market. 
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where:
y
t j, 3  is the unit profit of  activity in sector j; t j PE ,  is the export price of good j
t j PD ,  is the domestic price of  good j;
v
t j PY ,   is the price of value added per unit of 
output in activity j; Vy is a transformation elasticity parameter ;  P it ,  is the price of final 
goods used as intermediate goods;  
e
j G  is the share parameter for exports in total 
production; v
j T  is the share of costs paid to labour and capital;  d
j T  is the cost share of 
domestic intermediate inputs; 
d
j i a ,  are input-output coefficients for domestic supply of 
intermediate goods. Goods produced at home and foreign countries are considered 
closed substitutes, Armington assumption, popular in the applied general equilibrium 
literature and the production process is given by a nested production and trade 
functions.
The households pay taxes to the government and government returns part of this 
income to the poor households and spends rest of it to provide public services.
t i GY t i P
i
p






t wLS l t
i t i I t i P
vk
i t





t i C t i P
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i t
h i t i K t r
k
i t t REV
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , ,
¦  ¦  ¦  ¦ 
 ¦  ¦  ¦  
where: REVt  is total government revenue and 
k
i t  is a composite tax rate on capital 
income from sector I,
vc
l t  is the ad valorem tax rate on final consumption by 
households,
vg
i t  is that on public consumption and 
vk
i t  is the ad valorem tax rate on 
investment,  l t  is the tax rate on labour income of the household,  
p
i t  is the tax on 
production, and 
m
i t  is the tariff on imports. 
The steady equilibrium growth path of the economy is determined in terms of the 
interest rate, discount factor and relative prices of goods and factors in which the 
excess demand for goods and factors are eliminated and resource balance condition 
holds for the economy and each household and the government and rest of the world 
sectors in each period and over the model horizon. It also shows how the income of 
each type of household evolves over time as a function of the relative prices of goods 
and share of households in income.  Government transfers can alter this equilibrium. 
  This class of models, with dynamics, multi-sectoral and multi-household 
structures are very comprehensive and cannot be presented in details for space 
reasons but their main advantage over the traditional partial equilibrium measures 
poverty alleviation are obvious. First, poverty can now be taken to be a part of the 
efficient and equitable resource allocation problem in the whole economy. It is studied 
along with the labour-leisure choices of households, skill-based employment decisions 
of firms, tax and income-based transfer policies by the government, relative prices of 
goods, services and factors and intertemporal optimisation process of millions of 
households and firms in the economy. Consequences in poverty of changes in tastes 
and foresightedness of consumers, adoption of technologies by firms, liberal, 
conservative or mixed market policies of the government and trade arrangements  Strategic and General Equilibrium Models
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under bilateral or multilateral arrangements of trade and subsequent impacts of depth 
of poverty can clearly be estimated under this modelling framework. It is better to 
consider all micro and macro economic factors and policy choices while designing 
redistribution with growth and welfare of different categories of households. 
This model is calibrated with micro consistent data contained in the input-
output tables of UK, USA and Nepal to the benchmark economies that evolve over 
time in their reference paths with allocation of resources occurring according to the  
system of relative prices that ultimately depend on preferences and endowments of 
households, technology of firms and policy choices of governments. These are 
applied to find the growth paths of income distributions of households in the model. As 
sample from these results, see the evolution of welfare for ten categories of 
households in the model presented in the Appendix (MPSGE/GAMS codes of these 
models can be provided for interested readers).
5. Conclusions 
  Incentive compatibility in poverty alleviation game for the most efficient and just 
allocation of resources and maximisation of social welfare requires cooperation from 
both rich and poor households, government and the global community. Non-
cooperation among them only deepens poverty with socially, economically and 
morally unacceptable magnitudes of malnutrition, hunger-disease-illness, tensions, 
conflict, illiteracy and lack of education and skills. Scientific economic analyses and 
systematic implementation of poverty reduction initiatives require strategic and multi-
household general equilibrium models to compliment standard Booth-Rowntree, Sen-
Atkinson and FGT or Jenkins-Lambert type absolute, relative, chronic or intensity 
measures of poverty in the existing literature. Bad game results in poverty and good 
game results in prosperity.  No analyses of poverty can be considered complete 
without evaluating the income and substitution effects on welfare of these households 
based on the price mechanism and allocation of resources in the wider economy. 
Over time bad game results in poverty and good game results in prosperity.
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Appendix
Profiles of Household Income from Tax Transfer in a Multi-household 
General Equilibrium Model 
(More of these results can be provided to the interested readers) 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 10: Impact of reforms in lifetime welfare of household 10
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